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Abstract
People are sometimes risk-averse in gains but risk-loving in losses. Such be-
havior and other anomalies underlying prospect theory arise from a model of local
status maximization in which consumers compare their wealth with other con-
sumers of similar wealth. This social explanation shares key features with the
psychological explanation oﬀered by Kahneman and Tversky.
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Rather than being consistently risk-averse, people are sometimes risk-averse in gains
but risk-loving in losses (Markowitz, 1952; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In their
formulation of prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky explain this anomaly by arguing
that people tend to perceive changes rather than absolute values and have diminishing
marginal sensitivity to changes. The utility function is therefore steepest in the region
closest to current wealth where marginal sensitivity to change is greatest and ﬂattens
in either direction as the change in wealth becomes larger and marginal sensitivity
diminishes. Since small changes in either direction have a disproportionate impact on
utility, consumers are more attracted to a certain small gain than the chance of a larger
gain and are also more repelled by a certain small loss than the possibility of a larger
loss.
We show that a social explanation based on local status maximization shares key
similarities with Kahneman and Tversky’s psychological explanation. Rather than as-
suming that people derive utility from their global status among the entire population
(Frank, 1985a; Robson, 1992; Kornienko, 2000), we assume they are concerned with
their status among others with similar wealth.1 In a global status model if the distribu-
tion of wealth is single-peaked the cumulative density function shifts from convexity to
concavity at the mode, implying the modal person is risk averse in gains and risk loving
in losses. In our local status model a much stronger result holds. We ﬁnd that for any
distribution of wealth everyone is risk averse in gains and risk loving in losses if they
are concerned with their status among a suﬃciently homogenous group centered around
their current wealth. Since small changes around current wealth induce disproportion-
ately large changes in status, small gains and losses have a disproportionate impact on
1 Concern for status can arise from signaling games (Veblen, 1899), competition for limited resources
such as mates (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite, 1992), and other factors. Frank (1985b) has emphasized
the importance of local status.
1utility. Just as in Kahneman and Tversky’s model, the result is people are risk averse
in gains but risk loving in losses.
A second behavioral regularity addressed by prospect theory is the tendency to turn
down any fair gamble with an equal chance of winning or losing (Markowitz, 1952; Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). To reconcile such “loss aversion” with risk-loving behavior
in losses, prospect theory assumes a kink in the utility function at current wealth. Local
status maximization does not produce this same kink but still oﬀers insight into the
phenomenon. If the wealth distribution is unimodal then the utility function’s inﬂec-
tion point is between modal and current wealth, implying consumers with above-modal
wealth have a locally concave utility function and will display some loss aversion. More
generally, if the reference group is suﬃciently concentrated around current wealth then
for any wealth distribution the gains to anyone from a symmetric gamble are either
negative or arbitrarily small.
Local status may also oﬀer some insight into the popularity of insurance and lottery
tickets. The tendency for consumers to simultaneously purchase both led Friedman
and Savage (1947) to suggest a utility function that was ﬁrst concave and then convex,
the opposite of prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky argue that such behavior
arises not from the shape of the utility function but because people overweight both the
small probability of winning a lottery and the small probability of events covered by
insurance.2 In a local status model the shape of the utility function may still be relevant
in explaining why some consumers purchase insurance while others purchase lottery
tickets. If a consumer’s reference group is not concentrated around her own wealth but
is suﬃciently concentrated around a higher wealth level the consumer will purchase a
lottery ticket with a payoﬀ exceeding that wealth level. Likewise, if the reference group
2This approach distinguishes prospect theory from Markowitz’s (1952) theory which explains all three
anomalies by a more complicated utility function centered around current wealth. Cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Wakker, 1995; Prelec, 1998) relies even more on
the weighting function rather than the shape of the utility function to explain observed anomalies.
2is suﬃciently concentrated around a lower wealth level the consumer will purchase an
insurance policy which prevents wealth from falling below that level.3
Regarding the general connection between status and nonstandard risk behavior,
introducing status into the utility function clearly allows for a wide range of complicated
utility functions, especially if people care about both status and absolute wealth. For
instance, Robson (1992) shows that the simultaneous purchase of insurance and lottery
tickets is possible if utility is convex in status and concave in wealth. And Coelho
and McClure (1998) show that, among other possibilities, the Markowitz (1952) utility
function with three inﬂection points can arise if people are interested in absolute wealth,
wealth relative to peers, and wealth of one’s peer group relative to non-peers.4 By
concentrating on limiting behavior as status becomes more localized, we are able to make
more speciﬁc predictions. We show that concern for local status produces a particular
set of behavior that, to varying degrees, is consistent with each of the principle anomalies
underlying prospect theory.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a simple one period model in which an individual chooses whether or not to
take a gamble. Since there is only one period, consumption and wealth are synonymous.
Wealth y is distributed in the population according to the density function f(·)w h i c h
is continuous, bounded, and has support on R.5 We assume that the reference group
for each individual is diﬀerent and in particular that individuals are more likely to
compare their position with other individuals of similar wealth levels. The distribution
3In this context “framing” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) can be interpreted as aﬀecting what
reference group a person uses.
4They follow Duesenberry (1949) in measuring status by wealth relative to a mean rather than
position in the wealth distribution so their results are not directly comparable with ours.
5Negative values are included to reﬂect the possibility of indebtedness. Restricting wealth to be
non-negative does not change the analysis.
3of individuals in the reference group for a person with wealth level yo is a weighted
function of the overall distribution of wealth where the weights depend on yo.L e tg(·)
represent the weight placed on wealth y in the reference group for a person with initial
wealth yo. We refer to this weighting function g(·) as the comparison density and assume
it is independent of the wealth distribution, is symmetric around mean and mode µg,
has variance σ2, and has support on R. We will initially consider the case where µg = yo
so that the comparison density is centered around current wealth. Later we will allow
the comparison density to be centered elsewhere. Combining the wealth and comparison







f(y)g(y)dy)−1 is a normalizing constant. Note that utility is simply the
fraction of people in one’s reference group who have lower wealth.6 If the comparison
density were completely diﬀuse then the reference group would be the entire population
and the utility function would be the same as that of a global status model.
Our local status utility function clearly allows for a wide range of possible shapes and
could change between convexity and concavity an unlimited number of times depending
on the shapes of the wealth and comparison densities. To make clearer predictions we
investigate behavior as the variance σ2 of the comparison density becomes smaller so
that the reference group becomes more homogeneous. In particular we consider limiting
behavior as σ2 approaches 0.
In order to investigate limiting behavior, we are interested in any sequence of sym-
metric mean-preserving comparison densities {gn(·)} with mean µg and variance σ2
n,s u c h
that the variances converge to zero, i.e. limn→∞ σ2
n = 0. The corresponding sequence of
6Robson’s (1992) global status model assumes utility is a convex rather than linear function of status.
As long as utility is a continuous function of status, allowing for convexity or concavity does not aﬀect
any of the results except Proposition 2(i) which is overturned by suﬃcient convexity (or concavity).







−∞ f(y)gn(y)dy)−1. To evaluate the behavioral implications of this se-
quence of utility functions we will use the following Lemma.7
Lemma For a bounded and continuous function f(·)o nR, if a sequence of symmetric


































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a t
R µg
−∞ gn(y)dy =1 /2 by the symmetry of the comparison









h(y)gn(y)dy = I1 + I2.
7The lemma implies the sequence {gn(·)} is a delta(-convergent) sequence, i.e. it converges to the
Dirac delta function. For more information on the Dirac delta function and delta sequences see, for
example, Kanwal (1997).








Since h(µg)=0a n dh(y) is continuous at x = µg,w eh a v el i m A→0 M(A)=0 . C o n s e -
quently, for any ²>0, there exists a real number A suﬃciently small that | I2 |< ²
2,a n d
this holds independent of M.
With the number A so chosen, it remains to be shown that | I1 | is suﬃciently small
for suﬃciently large n.S i n c e f(y) is bounded and | h(y) |<| f(y) | + | f(µg) |,i t
follows that | h(y) | is bounded in [−∞,µ g], say | h(y) |<B . Then, using Chebyshev’s
inequality,







With the number A ﬁxed, limn→∞
σ2
n
A2 = 0. This means that we can ﬁnd N such that






,n > N .




h(y)gn(y)dy |≤| I1 + I2 |≤| I1| + |I2 |<² , n>N ,
implying limn→∞
R µg
−∞ f(y)gn(y)dy = f(µg)/2. By the same logic
limn→∞
R ∞
µg f(y)gn(y)dy = f(µg)/2. ¥
The following considers two diﬀerent decisions facing an individual with wealth yo.8
The ﬁrst is to take either a certain gain or a gamble oﬀering a chance at a larger gain.
The second is to take either a certain loss or a gamble with the possibility of a larger loss.
8To avoid consideration of strategic interactions, we assume that only one individual faces a decision.
Some of the complexities of strategic interactions are explored in Robson (1992), Harbaugh (1996), and
Hopkins and Kornienko (2000).
6If concern for status is suﬃciently localized around current wealth then any individual
chooses the certain smaller gain in the ﬁrst case but the uncertain larger loss in the
second case.
Proposition 1 For any given y0, y00, yo, y∗,a n dy∗∗ where y0 <y 00 <y o <y ∗ <y ∗∗ and
any given α ∈ (0,1),i fµg = yo then (i) limn→∞(αUn(yo)+ (1−α)Un(y∗∗)− Un(y∗)) < 0
and (ii) limn→∞(αUn(y0)+ (1 − α)Un(yo)− Un(y00)) > 0.
Proof: (i) Since limn→∞σ2
n = 0, therefore limn→∞ Cn =1 /f(yo) > 0 by the Lemma.




(y∗ − yo)2 ≤ Un(y






(y∗∗ − yo)2 ≤ Un(y




Since limn→∞Un(yo)=( f(yo)/2)/f(yo)=1 /2 by the Lemma, limn→∞(αUn(yo)+ (1 −
α)Un(y∗∗)− Un(y∗)) = −α/2 < 0.












(y00 − yo)2 ⇒ lim
n→∞Un(y
00)=0 ,
so limn→∞(αUn(y0)+ (1 − α)Un(yo)− Un(y00)) = (1 − α)/2 > 0. ¥
The example of Figure 1 shows the impact of local status. Wealth follows a nor-
mal distribution with mean 10 and standard deviation 1 while the comparison den-
sity is a normal distribution with mean yo and standard deviation 1. Combining




φ(10,1)φ(yo,1)dy where φ(µ,σ) is the normal distribution with
mean µ and standard deviation σ. The three curves represent utility functions for
7Figure 1: Utility functions with local status
individuals with wealth levels yo =9 ,yo =1 0 ,a n dyo = 11 as shown from left to
right. Note that under global status maximization everyone shares the same utility
functionU(y)=
R b y
−∞ φ(10,1)dy so individuals with wealth above the inﬂection point at
the mean of 10 tend to be risk averse while individuals with wealth below the inﬂection
point tend to be risk loving. Under local status maximization people are more likely
to compare themselves with others of similar wealth so position in the overall wealth
distribution is less important. As status concerns become increasingly localized the in-
ﬂection point for each individual’s utility function becomes closer and closer to yo and
individuals become more generally risk averse in gains and risk loving in losses.
The fact that the inﬂection point is not exactly at yo is relevant for loss aversion.
Prospect theory argues that marginal utility is steeper in losses than in gains in the
area of yo, implying symmetric gambles are rejected. For individuals with above-modal
8wealth the inﬂection point can be arbitrarily close to yo but is below yo, implying the
utility function is concave at current wealth. Looking at Figure 1, it is apparent that the
comparatively wealthy individual with wealth yo = 11 is locally risk averse.9 The ﬁrst
part of the following proposition shows that individuals will avoid symmetric gambles
in the range where the wealth distribution is decreasing, as occurs for individuals with
above-modal wealth when the wealth distribution is unimodal. The second part shows
more generally that any symmetric gamble oﬀers no better than arbitrarily small gains if
the comparison density is suﬃciently concentrated around current wealth. This weaker
statement holds regardless of the distribution of wealth and regardless of the individual’s
wealth level.10
Proposition 2 For any given x>0 if µg = yo then (i) 1
2U(yo − x)+1
2U(yo + x) −
U(yo) is negative (positive) if f(y) is decreasing (increasing) on [y0 − x,y0 +x] and (ii)
limn→∞(1
2Un(yo − x)+ 1
2Un(yo + x)− Un(yo)) = 0.



















































9If, unlike this example, the distribution of wealth were skewed so that the mode was below the
median, then the utility function would be concave at current wealth for most consumers.
10The simplest way to explain any residual aversion to symmetric gambles is a healthy skepticism that
the gamble is really fair. Alternatively, the utility function may include a non-status component that
incorporates global risk aversion. For instance, the utility function could be U(b y)=C
R b y
−∞ f(y)c(y)dy+
v(b y)w h e r ev(·) is concave.
9Proof for the case with increasing f(y) is identical except the inequality is reversed.
(ii) Again limn→∞Cn =1 /f(yo) > 0 by the Lemma. Since f(y) is bounded, f(y) ≤ f
for all y. By Chebyshev’s inequality,








x2 ≤ Un(yo + x) ≤ 1 ⇒ lim
n→∞
Un(yo + x)=1 .




To explain the popularity of both insurance and lotteries, prospect theory argues that
people overweight small probabilities. Status models oﬀer a more limited explanation
that may capture why some people are willing to gamble while others take insurance.
As mentioned, if status concerns are global and the wealth distribution is single-peaked,
people below the mode are in the convex region of the utility function and people above
the mode are in the concave region, suggesting the former will be more disposed toward
gambling and the latter toward insurance, though exact behavior will depend on the
odds and payoﬀs. If the comparison density is suﬃciently diﬀuse then local status and
global status are equivalent so the same property holds in our model. As status becomes
more concentrated around current wealth Proposition 1 implies neither gambling nor
insurance has much appeal. Proposition 1 assumed that the comparison density was
centered around current wealth. The following proposition considers what happens when
the comparison density is centered elsewhere. We ﬁnd that when individuals compare
themselves to a group with higher wealth they will gamble and when they compare
themselves to a group with lower wealth they will purchase insurance.11
11For symmetry we are taking the case of buying insurance as the status quo so that yo is wealth
when insurance is bought. If not buying insurance were the status quo then the result would be that
the consumer will buy insurance if the reference group is below the consumer’s wealth after purchasing
insurance.
10Proposition 3 For any given y0, yo, y00 where y0 <y o <y 00 and any given α ∈
(0,1),t h e n(i) limn→∞(αUn(y0)+ (1 − α)Un(y00)− Un(yo)) > 0 if µg ∈ (yo,y00) and
(ii) limn→∞(αUn(y0)+ (1 − α)Un(y00)− Un(yo)) < 0 if µg ∈ (y0,y o).













(y00 − µg)2 ≤ Un(y
00) ≤ 1 ⇒ lim
n→∞Un(y
00)=1 .
(i)F o ryo <µ g Chebyshev’s inequality implies
0 ≤ Un(yo) ≤ fCn
σ2
n
(µg − yo)2 ⇒ lim
n→∞Un(yo)=0 ,
so that limn→∞(αUn(y0)+( 1− α)Un(y00) − Un(yo)) = 1 − α > 0.




(yo − µg)2 ≤ Un(yo) ≤ 1 ⇒ lim
n→∞
Un(yo)=1 ,
so that limn→∞(αUn(y0)+( 1− α)Un(y00) − Un(yo)) = −α < 0. ¥
3C o n c l u s i o n
By introducing local status into a status utility model this note revealed a close con-
nection between status concerns and prospect theory. Prospect theory argues that in-
dividuals are disproportionately concerned with small gains and small losses since their
sensitivity to change decreases as changes become larger. We showed that a similar
eﬀect arises in a model of local status maximization for social rather than psychological
11reasons. Since individuals are most likely to compare their status with others of compa-
rable wealth, they are most concerned with small changes around their current wealth,
and are therefore risk loving in losses and risk averse in gains. We also showed that other
anomalies underlying prospect theory may reﬂect local status concerns. Regarding loss
aversion, suﬃcient concern for local status implies that symmetric gambles either re-
duce utility or oﬀer arbitrarily small gains. Regarding the coexistence of insurance and
lotteries, individuals whose reference group is wealthier than they are will tend to buy
lottery tickets, while individuals whose reference group is poorer than they are will tend
to buy insurance.
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